Verification of large and complicated concurrent programs is an important issue in the software world.
Introduction
In recent years, it has become more prevalent to develop concurrent programs in order to utilize the computational power of parallel or multi-core processors. These types of programs are very difficult to verify. Even by using conventional methods of testing, such as various forms of stress and random testing, it is still difficult to detect all concurrency errors in such programs [1] . Obviously, it is not possible for programmers to manually verify concurrent programs with all their complexities; hence, automatic verification is an essential need in the software world.
Software developers may use different methods to ensure their programs work correctly. A promising method for detecting and debugging concurrency errors [1, 2] is known as Model checking [2, 3] .
In order for a programmer to directly verify code of a written program, code model checking [4, 5] is an appropriate method. From one point of view, code model checking can be classified into two categories: (1) stateful model checking, and (2) stateless model checking. Although stateful techniques are ideally suited to verify sequential programs, they usually run into the state space explosion problem verifying parallel programs. Owing to saving (all) the state space, the rise in the concurrency level may result in more complexity as well as the exponentially growth of the state space. In such situations, stateless model checking [1, 6] can be useful. Stateless model checking is especially appropriate to explore the state space of large and complicated programs because accurate capturing and controlling all the needed states of a large program could be a hard, or even impossible, task [1, 4, 7] . Global variables, heap, thread stacks, and register contexts are all part of the program state. Even if all the program states could be captured and controlled, processing such large states would be very expensive [8, 9] .
A stateless model checker explores the state space of a program without capturing any program states. The program is executed under the control of a special scheduler, which systematically enumerates all execution paths of the program obtained by the nondeterministic choices. In other words, the scheduler controls the nondeterministic execution of threads [1, 4, 10] . As this method is applied to the source code level, it is very similar to software testing. In fact, it is a systematic testing method. A stateless model checker systematically explores all possible interleavings of the program threads under specific input for that program. That is to say, a stateless model checker explores the state space of a program by concretely and continuously re-executing the program such that the model checker generates a different thread scheduling scenario for each execution [11] . Therefore, all execution paths of the program generating by nondeterministic choices are covered [1, 10] . Although that stateless model checkers do not suffer from state space explosion owing to their stateless nature, they do not support verifying LTL formulae.
However, there are some techniques for LTL checking in runtime verification [12] that can also be applied to stateless model checking.
Runtime verification is a technique in which, at run time, a monitor checks whether the execution of a system under inspection satisfies a given correctness temporal property [13] . Although runtime verification has a lot in common with stateless model checking, there is an important difference: in stateless model checking, all executions of a given system are examined to answer whether these satisfy a given property. In contrast, runtime verification does not consider each possible execution of a system, but just a single or a finite subset [14] . While both of the techniques are incomplete, stateless model it is not as incomplete as runtime verification. Even so, both of these techniques deal with finite traces and verify concrete executions of a program.
In runtime verification, the monitor interrupts the program execution when its state with respect to an event of interest changes, then evaluates a set of logical properties, and finally resumes the program execution. The main problem here is that the monitor has to act sequentially. Another problem is that, usually in runtime verification, the program trace first has to be stored and then can be analyzed [13] .
Runtime verification of temporal logic properties requires a definition of the truth value of these properties on the finite paths that are observed at runtime. Although the semantics of temporal logic on infinite paths has been precisely defined, there is not yet an agreement on the definition of the semantics on finite paths [15] . Currently, there are some LTL semantics on finite paths [14] [15] [16] [17] , the most widely used of them for monitor construction are LTL 3 [14] and FLTL [16] .
However, in [15] , Morgenstern et al. proved that even a 4-valued semantics is not sufficient to achieve a semantics on finite paths that converges to the semantics on infinite paths. To the best of our knowledge, the semantic proposed in [15] is the most complete semantic that converges to the infinite path semantics [15] . This paper proposes a novel parallel encoding of LTL semantics [15] into an actor-based system, which can be used for monitor construction in runtime verification improving its efficiency. In addition, it is suited to apply to stateless model checking. In our method, there is no need to save any states or traces of a running program. Instead of translating an LTL formula into a Buechi automaton, which is the standard approach in model checking, the formula is translated into a set of actors that communicate with one another as well as with the main engine that explores the state space (i.e. the same stateless model checker). As state space explosion is one of the main obstacles in practical applications of model checking, having such techniques that do not rely on recording of the visited states, can be a solution to this problem. We model the proposed method using Rebeca [18, 19] , which is an actor-based modeling language with a formal foundation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the formal background required for this paper. Section 3 covers related work. Section 4 describes the proposed method for verifying LTL formulae. In this section, we model our method using Rebca modeling language, specify the properties of the model in LTL, and then describe the verification process and results. Section 5 gives an example to illustrate the proposed method. Section 6 briefly discusses the implementation issues. Finally, Section 7 mentions some concluding remarks.
Preliminaries
This section presents the formal background of this paper. The first subsection is a brief introduction to the semantics of LTL. The next subsection explains the semantic of a program state in stateless model checking. Finally, the last subsection briefly introduces the Actor model [20] as well as Rebeca modeling language [21] used in order to model actors' interactions.
Linear temporal logic (LTL)
This subsection is a brief introduction to (propositional) linear temporal logic [22] , a logical formalism that is appropriate for specifying linear-time (LT) properties [2] . LTL is called linear because the qualitative notion of time is path-based and viewed to be linear: at each moment of time there is only one possible successor state, and thus each time moment has a unique possible future. Technically speaking, this follows from the fact that the LTL formulae are path-based (i.e. they are interpreted in terms of sequences of states) [2] .
In the context of stateless model checking, we have to reason with linear temporal logic on truncated paths. A truncated path is a path that is finite, but not necessarily maximal [17] .
Currently, a lot of different semantics for LTL on finite traces have been proposed [14, 16, 17, 23, 24] . As mentioned, we use the RV ∞ -LTL semantics [15] in this paper. So, this section describes the semantics of RV ∞ -LTL from [15] .
For a given set of boolean variables (propositions) AP, the set of LTL formulas is defined by the following grammar: 
.
The semantics of LTL is typically defined as follows [15, 22] :
(Semantics of LTL on infinite paths). Given an infinite word σ, the following rules define the semantics of LTL: 
In [15] , a hierarchy of temporal formulae has been defined by the grammar rules of Table 1 . 
In [15] , LTL semantics for all classes shown in Table 1 have been defined. In this paper, for the sake of brevity, we only propose our method for the classes TL G and TL F . However, the method can be extended to cover all other semantics. It should be pointed out that the semantic of FLTL [16] and RV ∞ -TL G are evaluated in the same manner [15] . Therefore, our proposed method can be applied for monitor construction based on FLTL semantic as well. For a complete discussion on RV ∞ -LTL, please see [15] .
Program states
In a multi-threaded program containing a finite set of threads and a set of shared objects, threads communicate with each other only through shared objects. 
Actor model
Actor is a model for concurrent computing to develop parallel and distributed systems. Each actor is an autonomous entity that acts asynchronously and concurrently with other actors. It can send/receive messages to/from other actors, create new actors, and update its own local state. An actor system is composed of a collection of actors, some of whom may send messages to (or receive messages from) actors outside the system [28] . An actor using a command like send (a, v) creates a new message with receiver a and contents v, and then puts it to the message delivery system. This system guarantees the received message will be finally delivered to actor a. It can create another actor with a command like newadr(). Suchlike commands create a new actor and return its address. Each actor may have its own behaviors to process received messages. In other words, an actor's behavior embodies the code that should be executed by the actor after receiving a message [29] .
As we stated, this paper uses the Actor model to propose its new verification method, which is also implemented by using an actor language. An actor language is an extension of a functional language. Erlang [30, 31] is arguably the best known implementation of the Actor model [28] .
We are implementing the method proposed in this paper by using Erlang. In such languages, functions are used to define actors' behaviors. That is, each actor has a behavioral functional that embodies the actor behaviors after receiving particular messages.
In this paper, we model our method using Rebeca (Reactive Object Language) [18, 19] , which is an actor-based modeling language with a formal foundation [18] . Then, we use the model checking technique to verify our models. For this purpose, model checker RMC [32] is used, which is a tool for direct model checking of Rebeca models, without using back-end model checkers.
Using RMC, properties should be specified based on state variables of rebecs.
Rebeca is a Java-like language, which is mainly a modeling language with formal verification support and a background theory [21] . A Rebeca model consists of concurrently executing reactive objects called rebecs. In fact, rebecs are actors that communicate with each another by asynchronous message passing. Each message is put in the unbounded queue of the receiver rebec, specifying a unique method to be invoked when the message is serviced [19] . After these declarations, the methods that handle messages are defined like Java code. These methods are called the message servers of the reactiveclass because their task is to serve incoming messages. Each reactive class definition has a message server named initial. In the initial state, each rebec has an initial message in its message queue, thus the first method executed by each rebec is the initial message server.
A message server contains one or more Rebeca statements. The logical and arithmetic expressions in Rebeca are similar to Java. However, not all of the Java expressions are valid in
Rebeca, and only a set of essential set of operators are included [33] . For more information about Rebeca, please see [18, 33] . The execution of rebecs in a Rebeca program takes place in a coarse grained interleaving scheme. In this manner, each rebec takes a message from the top of its queue and executes its corresponding message server. During execution, other rebecs are not allowed to be executed;
i.e. the execution of a message server is atomic [33, 34] .
Related work
As far as we know, prior to DSCMC [27, 35] LTL checking algorithms usually follow an automata-based approach taken from [40] . In this approach, the negation of the LTL formula is translated into a Buchi automaton [2, 41] , synchronized with the transition system of the program state space, and then the verification problem is reduced to a simple graph problem [41] . Handling of large state spaces is so difficult Even if a program only contains a few variables, the state space that must be analyzed may be very large. This exponential growth in the number of parallel components and the number of variables leads to the enormous size of the state space of practically relevant systems. The reality is that verification problem in stateful model checking is particularly space-critical [2] .
Nevertheless, many researches have been undertaken into this field leading the way to great achievements including some recent work in [42] [43] [44] [45] .
Of all the research in this area, the work by Ganai et al. [45] Another work in this area was carried out by Evangelista and Kristensen [42] . They proposed an algorithm that is a combination of the common on-the-fly LTL model checking algorithms with sweep-line method [46] . Conventional on-the-fly LTL model checking is based on the exploration of a product Buchi automaton; i.e. the negation of the LTL formula to be checked is represented as a Buchi automaton, and then the product of this property automaton and the state space, viewed as a Buchi automaton, are explored using a nested depth-first traversal [41] in search for a cycle containing an acceptance state (an acceptance cycle). This work also has nothing to do with stateless model checking and is appropriate to the stateful techniques.
De Wulf et al. [43] proposed algorithms for LTL satisfiability and model-checking. In their algorithms nondeterministic automata were not constructed from LTL formulae. They directly alternated automata using efficient exploration techniques based on anti-chains. Similar to the previous work, their method is also not suitable for stateless model checking.
In the literature, the concept of runtime verification really stands out, which checks whether a system execution satisfies or violates a given correctness property [47] . A procedure that on-thefly verifies conformance of the system's behavior to the specified property is called a monitor.
The main idea of runtime verification is to monitor and analyze software and hardware system executions. Although this idea is fairly analogous to the idea of stateless model checking, methods used for runtime verification are completely different. In runtime verification, monitoring is carried out as follows. Two "black boxes", the system and its reference model, are executed in parallel and stimulated with the same input sequences; the monitor dynamically captures their output traces and tries to match them. The main problem is that a model is usually more abstract than the real system, both in terms of functionality and timing. For this reason, trace-to-trace matching is difficult, which causes the system to generate events in different order or even miss some of them [47] .
Nowadays, there are a variety of formalisms to specify properties on observed behavior of computer systems including variants of temporal logic such as LTL 3 and TLTL [14] . In addition, currently, a lot of methods have been proposed to construct monitors [14, 15, 47] . As both stateless model checking and runtime verification deal with finite paths, current semantics of temporal logic on finite paths can be applied to the stateless model checking field.
The main problem in runtime verification is the extra overhead imposed by the monitor. Having an efficient monitor plays an important part in reducing the cost of verification. Several techniques have been proposed in this regard, such as improved instrumentation (e.g., using
aspect-oriented programming [48] ), combining static and dynamic analysis techniques [49, 50] , efficient monitor generation and management [51] , and schedulable monitoring [52] . Each of the forgoing approaches remedies the overhead issue to some extent and in specific contexts.
However, there has been little work on reducing and containing the overhead of runtime verification through isolating the monitor in a different processing unit. With this motivation in mind, Berkovich et al. [13] proposed a technique that permits the separation of the functional from monitoring concerns into different computing units. Their formal language for monitoring properties is LTL 3 . In their method, a host process receives the program trace in the shared memory and distributes chunks of this trace among a set of monitoring worker threads running on the GPU. The worker threads are capable of monitoring one or more properties simultaneously.
Our method can also isolate the monitoring unit in a different computing unit. In [13] , the program trace has to be saved first, and then it is distributed to different processing units for analysis. However, in our method, there is no need to save any program traces or states at all.
The problem with saving the program trace is that the causal order of occurrence of events in the program trace has to be respected while evaluating a property in a parallel fashion. For this reason, authors in [13] had to formalize a notion of LTL 3 property history to encode the causal order of events for parallelization. Therefore, their approach demands more time and memory in comparison with our proposed method.
To sum up, as far as we know, any LTL verification method in the stateless model checking field has not been proposed yet; this paper presents a new LTL checking method for this field, which can also be considered as a method for constructing a parallel and distributed monitor in runtime verification. To check an LTL formula by our method, first a property is parsed, next an actor whose behavior corresponds to the root operator is created, and then existing sub-trees of the root are sent to the behavioral function of this actor as its arguments; e.g. in the above example, an actor who behaves corresponding to operator U is created and two sub-trees are sent to its behavioral function as its input arguments. Thereafter, this actor also makes the parse tree for each input argument (i.e. each sub-tree). In the same way, an actor for the root operator of each sub-tree is created and related sub-trees are sent to them. This process is continued by new actors until reaching the leaves; e.g., in this example, the actor with until behavior creates another actor with not behavior, and then the created actor creates a new actor with and behavior. When this new actor reaches a leaf (i.e. a simple condition) after parsing one of its arguments, it should create a new actor that checks a simple condition (we call such actors condition checkers). The intermediate nodes of the primary parse tree are called workers that are actors that behave corresponding to LTL operators. This hierarchical structure described here is shown in Figure 3 (a). There are two other kinds of actor in this hierarchy, property checker and master, which are described below.
An Actor formalism for LTL
In this paper, we suppose the existence of a mechanism in the model checker so that condition checkers are be able to monitor the state of the intended APs. At the implementation level, the model checker can think of different mechanisms. For example, based on the property the user has defined, it can instrument the program code such that at every point in the code that the variables in the APs of the property are defined † , a piece of code is added to the original code, by which the simple conditions in the property (i.e. APs) can be monitored during stateless model checking. By doing so, condition checkers are informed about the status of their desired APs at the end of each state. ‡ A similar mechanism has been implemented in DSCMC [27] . † The variable definition means that a new value is assigned to the variable (e.g. using of the assignment operator "="). ‡ The definition of a state in the context of stateless model checking is given in Section 2.1.3. The unit of LTL checking (Figure 3 (a) ) has a major actor as the master actor, whose task is to load the user-defined LTL properties at the beginning of stateless model checking, and then create a property checker actor for each property. The property checker actors use a function for parsing a given property. This function creates the parse tree of its input argument, and then returns the root of this tree and sub-trees of the root. Thereafter, the property checker creates a worker that will be in charge of the sub-tree. The return sub-tree is also sent as an input argument to the behavioral functions of this worker.
As mentioned, the created worker by property checker also parses its input arguments (i.e. subtree(s) sent by property checker). Then, with respect to the parse tree of its arguments, it also creates other worker actor(s). Needless to say, workers are different in their behavior.
Permissible behaviors for workers exactly correspond to LTL operators. For example, and worker, not worker, and until worker have the same semantics of operators ˄, ¬, and U, respectively. You can see the procedure for creating the described hierarchy in Figure 4 
Modeling the stateless model checking of LTL operators in Rebeca
This section models the actor system described in the previous subsection. In this regard, we use Rebeca modeling language [18, 19] .
We need an abstract model that correctly embodies the possible interactions between actors. For this purpose, we exploit the hierarchical structure shown in Figure 3 . In this structure, the position of an intermediate node (worker) is similar to Figure 3 (b) . As described earlier, workers correspond to LTL operators. The behavior of each worker actor is modeled in Rebeca using the structure shown in Figure 3 . That is, each worker has a supervisor and at least one child. In other words, each worker is an LTL operator that can have at most two children. Each child may also be an LTL operator. Besides, condition checkers are also children of their immediate parent (worker). Each worker has one supervisor (its immediate parent), which may be an LTL operator or a property checker. As it can be seen, a child only sends its evaluation result (true or false) to its supervisor, regardless of whether it is a condition checker or an LTL operator. A supervisor also can receive either true or false from the worker regardless of the fact that the worker is which LTL operator.
On account of the above structure, it does not matter to a worker who its children and its supervisor are. Every worker only receives true or false from its children, and only sends true or false to its supervisor. Therefore, we can model the LTL checking unit, and verify the behavior of each actor (i.e. behavioral functions) independently. In this model, the behavior of each worker is characterized in Rebeca, and then other actors the worker can communicate with are modeled as black boxes that correspond to the same worker's supervisor and children. That is, black boxes used in the model, namely Child, and Parent, are actors that behave like a child and a supervisor, respectively (see Figure 3) . A child is expected to send only either true or false to the worker, and a supervisor also expects to receive the result of the verification from the worker.
Even so, in practice, when there are some until operators in a property, some actors may be waiting for receiving results from their children. In other words, it is possible for an intermediate actor not to hear from its children in a particular state. We have to model this fact, hence, in our models, workers/ supervisors/ children send three types of message: (1) a message that models true, (2) a message that models false, and (3) a message that models a waiting state.
Before moving on to modeling, we should point out the role of actors master, property checker, and condition checker. These actors are important when it comes to the implementation of the model. In terms of modeling, it makes no difference to the result of verification who creates property checkers and workers, or how the model checker informs condition checkers about the APs status. The main focus of the model should be maintained on how a worker behaves as a particular LTL operator, and how it evaluates its operands. For this reason, we model a worker regardless of who its parent and child (children) are. For instance, as for the Until operator, the model should demonstrate the way by which this actor evaluates results of its operand; e.g. how to act when it receives a true message from its left operand, how to act when it never receives a true from its right operand, and so on.
We model the behavior of the workers that correspond to and (˄), not (¬), and Until (U)
operators. Other LTL operators can be derived from these operators. Each of the forgoing operators is independently modeled; i.e. the children (or supervisor) of each operator are viewed as a black boxes that only send (or receive) true and false. has to come a decision about the verification result at the end of each iteration. As you can see, the end of each iteration has been modeled at line 9 of Figure 5 (a) .
In the models, we suppose that Child (Figure 5 (b) ) is an intermediate worker that its immediate supervisor is one of the LTL operators and, not, or until. Practically, such an actor receives the results of verification from its children, but here, rebec Child itself randomly generates this results at line 12, Figure 5 (c). Here, the Child randomly generates three results, which is the same three types for a result message described above: true (modeled with 1), false (modeled with 0), and a waiting state (modeled with 2). When modeling a waiting state, message operator.from_leftChild (false, false) is used (like line 15 of Figure 5 (c) ). The second argument in this message models a waiting state; when this argument is false, it shows a waiting state. In this case, the value of the first argument does not matter. But, if the second argument is true, it shows that the Child is sending a result to its supervisor (true or false), which is sent via the first argument in the message (see lines 16-27 of Figure 5 (c) ).
There are two rebecs of Child in our model: leftWorker and rightWorker. For a binary operator, the worker corresponding to that operator receives two results: one is sent by rightWorker and the other is sent by leftWorker. As for the unary operator not, only messages from leftWorker are processed.
In the models, rebec Supervisor ( Figure 5 (b) ) models the immediate supervisor of the worker whose behavior is supposed to be modeled (i.e. one of the workers that acts as one of the LTL operators not, and, until). Supervisor using message server result_fromOp receives the result of verification from such a worker (line 5, Figure 5 (b) ). As you can see, this method also has two arguments whose second one models a waiting state.
In Rebeca, verification is performed based on state variables of rebecs so for the rebecs in Figure   5 ., two variables used to specify properties of our models are state variables result and resultReceived in rebec Supervisor (lines 4-5 , Figure 5 (b) ). The received result from the LTL operator (worker) is saved in variable result. We need variable resultReceived while modeling because Rebeca initializes state variables at the beginning of execution so the variable result has a value even before receiving the real result from the worker. Therefore, when resultReceived turns into true, it denotes that the Supervisor has just received the result from the worker (at line 8 Figure 5 (b) ). If the supervisor runs into a waiting state, the resultReceived will remain false. Figure 6 shows the rebec for the actor that behaves corresponding to LTL operator until. As our method uses the Actor model, it is nondeterministic that which actor first processes its incoming messages. Therefore, in the model, you may see some code or state variables for required synchronization. For example, when leftWorker and rightWorker send their own results to rebec Until, it is unpredictable that which actor first sends its message. However, we know that both of them send messages about the same state. Therefore, rebec Until first requires to receive both of these messages, and then evaluates them. This situation is modeled using state variables rFlag and lFlag as well as message servers from_leftChild and from_rightChild.
Modeling the LTL operator Until
When both of variables lFlag and rFlag become true, it means that rebec Until has received the result from both of its children then it comes to processing. Therefore, method until_bhv at line 13 of Figure 6 is executed. In this method, the rebec uses variables leftOp and rightOp. Variable leftOp contains the value of the last message sent by leftWorker. In the same way, rightOp contains the value of the last message sent by rightWorker.
Figure 6 Rebeca model for Until worker
In order to verify the model, we use two state variables updatedLeftOp and updatedRightOp, which contain the results respectively sent by leftWorker and rightWorker after synchronization. This is because the initial state that should be considered to verify the model is not the same rightWorker. This situation brings about some problem while specifying properties of the model because the until operator is sensitive to the initial state of its operands. To resolve this issue, we use auxiliary variables updatedLeftOp and updatedRightOp for specifying properties.
As mentioned, it is possible for the until worker to receive nothing from one or two of its children in practice (i.e. a waiting state). Therefore, it is also possible for the until rebec to receive a message that shows a waiting state. Boolean variables l_st and r_st model this situation. Variable l_st holds the second argument of method from_leftChild. As mentioned above, if this argument is false, it shows a waiting state. In the same way, variable r_st keeps the second argument of method from_rightChild. This fact is also true of other workers (Not and
And).
Method until_bhv models the until operator in the RV ∞ -TL G semantic, where an operator evaluates ⊤ G when there is no next state. For this reason, when an iteration of stateless model checking comes to an end, all workers will receive the endprog ( ) message (like line 51 of Figure 6 ). As this message shows that there will be no next state in the program execution, workers send true to its supervisor. As for until, the rebec sends message result_fromOp (true, true) to the supervisor on line 52.
As the RMC model checker expects non-terminating models so as not to report a deadlock, we use method endV ( ) in the models.
Modeling the LTL operator And
The rebec corresponding to LTL operator ∧ in RV ∞ -TL G is shown in Figure 7 . This rebec also first receives the results from both of its children using message servers from_leftChild and from_rightChild, and then it behaves as LTL operator ∧ using method and_bhv at line 11 of Rebec And uses two state variables leftOp and rightOp for saving the results sent by leftWorker and rightWorker, respectively. In addition, these variables are used for specifying the properties of the model as well as its verification.
Modeling the LTL operator Not
The rebec shown in Figure 8 models the behavior of the worker that acts as LTL operator ¬ in RV ∞ -TL G . For the sake of brevity, we use the same structure of Child and SMC shown in Figure   5 for the Not rebec. Therefore, this rebec also has a message server named from_righChild, while this message server has no effect on the behavior of this rebec because it only considers the result sent by leftWorker saving it in state variable opr at line 10. This state variable is used for verifying the model as well.
After receiving the message from its child, rebec Not processes that using method not_bhv at line 5. That is, it negates opr and sends it for its Supervisor (i.e. variable parent) on line 6. 
Verification results
To verify our model, we use model checking; in this section, properties that should be satisfied by models are specified in LTL. We have used model checker RMC [32] for verifying our models. § In terms of LTL operator U, the safety property, which was verified and proved to be true in the model, is that when left operand remains true until the right operand becomes true, Supervisor should receive a true message from rebec Until, otherwise it should receive a false. In our method, as described above, the left operand is the same result sent by leftWorker saved in updatedLeftOp, and the right operand is the same result sent by rightWorker saved in updatedRightOp. This property is specified in LTL as follows:
The safety property that rebec And is expected to hold is that Supervisor receives a true from rebec And when both of its left operand and right operand are true, otherwise it should receive a false. This property was also verified and proved true. In our model, the left operand is the same result sent by leftWorker, and the right operand is one sent by rightWorker, which are saved in variables leftOp and rightOp, respectively. Therefore, the LTL specification of this property is as For LTL operator ¬, it is expected that Supervisor receives a true from rebec Not if the operand of operator ¬ is false. Obviously, in our method, the operand of a not operator is an actor. In the models, the value of this operand is the same result sent by leftWorker to rebec Not. The rebec saves this value into its state variable opr. Therefore, the LTL property should be held by rebec Not is as follows: Table 2 shows the results of the verification of the forgoing properties by model checker RMC [32] . 
An illustrative example
This section describes a simple example of stateless model checking of an LTL property to illustrate the proposed method. This example is a version of the mutual exclusion problem with two threads. The pseudo code of the problem is shown in Figure 9 (a). The safety property that program should satisfy is that two threads do not enter the critical section at the same time, which is specified in LTL as "G (¬ (crit1 ∧ crit2))"; consequently, the APs used by the user in the LTL property are crit1 and crit2. In this section, we describe the process of verification of this property step by step. It should be pointed out that this property can be verified via the RV ∞ -TL G semantic because its grammar corresponds to the TL G category.
As we described, the stateless model checker is expected to partition the program code according to visible operations. You can see the partitioned code of Figure 9 (a) in Figure 9 (b). Based on the rule of partitioning, each of T1 and T2 is divided into six locations. During stateless model checking, the model checker schedules threads based on these locations. At the end of each location (i.e. after a thread yields the CPU due to reaching the end of its current location), the model checker informs condition checkers about the current status of their AP. Hereafter, we suppose that stateless model checker has partitioned the program (i.e. Figure 9 (b)) and is ready to start model checking. Now, let us start explaining the verification process for this example. First of all, the master actor loads the defined property. Here, the user has defined only one property so master only creates one property checker, which is responsible for verifying the specified property. Now, property checker should create the hierarchy of workers. Frist, it standardizes the specified property as follows:
Next, property checker should parse this property and initiates creation of the hierarchy of workers. The parse tree for this property is shown in Figure 10 . After parsing, property checker creates a worker that behaves as a not operator, and sends the sub-tree of the not operator to this
worker. This worker also parses the received sub-tree, creates an until worker, and sends the subtree under operator until to the created worker. The until worker also parses its sub-trees and creates a condition checker as its right child, which only generates true. For its left child, the until worker creates an and worker sending the reminder of the tree to this worker. After parsing the received sub-tree, the and worker creates two condition checkers that check APs crit1 and crit2.
After creating the hierarchy, the model checker starts to explore the state space and verification.
Suppose the model checker first schedules T2; therefore, T2 performs its computation from the beginning of location 1 to the end of this location. At the end of this location, T2 is preempted, and the stateless model checker sends the status of APs to the condition checkers. At this time, both of crit1 and crit2 are false, hence "condition checkers 2" and "condition checkers 3" send false to the "worker 3" (see Figure 10 ). As "worker 3" is an and operator, it generates false because both of its operands are false. Therefore, "worker 2" receives a false message from its right worker and receives a true from its left worker.
According to the behavior of an until worker (Figure 6 ), the "worker 2" still waits for hearing from its children in the next status. For the sake of brevity, we summarize this process in Table   3 . As you can see in We go on explaining with s 7 , where T1 enters the critical section and crit1 becomes true. As a result, at the end of this state, "condition checker 2" receives a true message and "condition checker 3" receives a false. Consequently, "worker 3" generates a false message so the reminder of the process is similar to what was described above. This situation recurs until the end of s 9 , where T2 also enters the critical section causing crit2 to become true. At the end of s 10 , the model checker sends true to both "condition checker 2" and "condition checker 3", whereby "worker 3" also concludes a true result, and sends it to "worker 2".
Therefore, "worker 2" receives true from both left worker and right worker so it also sends a true message to "worker 1". As "worker 1" is a not operator, it negates the received result.
Consequently, "worker 1" evaluates the result of verification as false. This result is sent to property checker. When property checker receives a (false, true) message, it concludes that a violation has occurred.
To briefly explain this example without complexity, we considered a non-terminating program. 
Implementation issues
All actors of the verification hierarchy act in parallel with the stateless model checker. This hierarchy is very quickly formed at the beginning of stateless model checking. We are going to implement our method by Erlang programming language [31] , in which processes (i.e. actors) are very lightweight and cheap to create (about 100 times lighter than threads) [53] . Message passing in Erlang is also very fast (about one micro second) [30, 53] . Therefore, there is no concern about the process creation and message-passing overhead. Erlang provides the best implementation of the Actor model [28] , whereby we can precisely implement the proposed method. Table 3 . The verification process for the example shown in Figure 9 s0 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10
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Conclusions
This paper proposes a new verification method for stateless model checking of LTL properties.
In our method verifies formulae dynamically without storing any program states. The proposed method is designed based on the Actor model. Thanks to this model, we can create cheap and lightweight actors that check LTL properties simultaneously with stateless state space exploration.
The method proposed in this paper is designed as the unit of LTL checking for DSCMC [27, 35] , which is a parallel stateless code model checker. We are implementing this method in DSCMC. This tool needs to analyze and instrument program code before performing stateless model checking. Currently, code is manually instrumented in DSCMC. Therefore, in the future, code instrumentation must be automated for using DSCMC in large programs. Once this has been done, we will be able to utilize the proposed method for real-world programs.
As for stateless model checking, it may be impractical to precisely handle non-deterministic user input. Then in practice, using the method to verify large programs may be transformed to systematically testing, but it is still powerful enough to explore the state space of large programs whose state space exploration is impractical using state-based methods [1, 4, 25, 26, 37, 54] .
However, to cover more execution paths, the method can be improved by employing test generation techniques, such as white-box fuzz testing [55, 56] and symbolic execution [57] .
